"The World and Japan" Database Project
Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations
Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo

[Title] John Foster Dulles's Speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference

[Place] San Francisco
[Date] September 5, 1951
[Source] Gaimusho joyaku-kyoku hokika, Heiwa joyaku no teiketsu ni kansuru chosho VII, pp.267-284.
[Notes]
[Full text]

Mr. President, Distinguished Delegates, we have met here for a consecrated purpose. We shall here make peace. "Blessed are the peacemakers." But the most blessed of this peace are not those of us who assemble here. The foundation for this peace was laid by the many who gave up their lives in faith that the very magnitude of their sacrifice would compel those who survived to find and take the way to peace.

We are here to redeem, in some small measure, the vast debt we owe.

That task is not a simple one. Victory usually gives power greater than should be possessed by those who are moved by the passions that war engenders. That is a principal reason why war has become a self-perpetuating institution.

The treaty before us is a step toward breaking the vicious cycle of war-victory-peace-war. The nations will here make a peace of justice, not a peace of vengeance.

True peace is possible because of what has been accomplished by 6 years of Allied occupation. That occupation was calm and purposeful. Japan's war-making power was destroyed. The authority and influence of those who committed Japan to armed conquest was eliminated. Stern justice was meted out to the war criminals, while mercy was shown the innocent. There has come freedom of speech, of religion, of thought; and respect for fundamental human rights. There has been established, by the will of the people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government, which we are happy to welcome here.

The Allied occupation goals set forth in the Potsdam Surrender Terms have been met, with the loyal cooperation of the Japanese people. It is now time to end that occupation, and make a peace which will restore Japan as a sovereign equal.

It is possible now to make that kind of a peace, to make this a peace of reconsiliation, because the Japan of today is transformed from the Japan of yesterday.

The past is not forgotten or excused. Bitterness and distrust remain the sentiment of many. That is human. Those who have suffered less have no warrant to set themselves up as moral judges of those who have suffered more. But time, and the good use to which it has been put in Japan, have somewhat healed the scars of war. New hopes have gradually displaced old fears. Now, by an effort of self-control which is perhaps unprecedented in history, the Allies present to Japan a treaty which shows no trace of angry passion.

That is not merely an act of generosity towards a vanquished foe, it is an act of enlightened self-interest. For a treaty warped by passion often becomes a boomerang which, thrown against an enemy, returns to strike its authors.

For this treaty, we are deeply indebted to the man who led the Allied Powers to victory in the Pacific. After that victory he devoted 5 1/2 years to service in Japan as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. As such he showed not only magnanimity, but strength, without which magnanimity is counted weakness. He provided the Occupation with moral leadership which has been the impulsion for the kind of peace we make. The present generation and generations to come owe much to General MacArthur.

In framing the peace, the United States has taken an initiative. That was plainly our duty.

Some now find it expedient to disparage the role played by the United States in the Pacific war. None did so in the hour of victory. Then, by a unanimous Allied act, the United States was given the exclusive power to name the Supreme Commander for all the Allied Powers and to direct the Occupation which would prepare Japan for the peace to come. That Allied act put us in a position uniquely to judge when the Japanese were prepared for peace. It surely entitled us, indeed it obligated us, to take timely steps to bring our Occupation responsibilities to their normal predestined end.

We first moved in this matter 4 years ago. In 1947 the United States proposed a preliminary conference of the governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission to consider plans for a Japanese peace treaty. That proposal was blocked by the insistence of the Soviet Union that the treaty could only be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers where the Soviet Union would have veto power. The Soviet Union continued stubbornly to adhere to that position.

Last year the United States decided to abandon the conference method, which afforded excessive possibilities of obstruction, and to seek peace through diplomatic precesses which no single nation could thwart. That has been done with the hearty cooperation of most of the Allies and has resulted in a finished text.

The negotiations began about a year ago when the Allies principally concerned were gathering to attend the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The various delegations principally concerned had frequent consultations at that time. Then came conferences at many capitals and many written exchanges of views. A United States Presidential Mission toured the globe, visiting 10 capitals of countries especially concerned. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom was exploring the problem within the Commonwealth, and its Representative will tell you more of that.

The first round of discussions dealt with the question of whether it was time for peace and, if so, what basic principles should be applied. In this connection the United States outlined seven principles which it felt ought to govern the framing of the treaty.

We found complete agreement to the urgency of prompt peace and general agreement as to the basic principles. So, in January of this year, the United States undertook to make the first draft of a text which would translate the agreed principles into treaty words. That draft was circulated last March, and was subjected to intensive study by over 20 countries. These included not only the Far Eastern Commission countries, but others which had expressed interest. The American states were kept informed, as was their due. Mexico had actively participated in the Pacific war, as had Brazil in the European war. All had made important political, economic, and moral contributions.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom produced a text of its own, drafted in the light of the Commonwealth conferences. Then in June, the United States United Kingdom combined their parallel efforts and jointly drafted a text to reconcile and reflect still more fully the different views that had been developed. This text was circulated to Allied Powers during the first half of July and was kept open for further changes until mid-August.

Throughout this period the Soviet Union took an active, though reluctant, part. We had several conferences with Yakov Malik, and our Governments have exchanged 10 memoranda and drafts.

Every nation which has constructively interested itself in the treaty can claim authorship of important parts of the present text. Also each of these nations can claim the equally honorable distinction of voluntarily subordinating some special interests so that a broad base of unity might be found. The Allied Powers have been conducting what, in effect, is an 11 months' peace conference participated in by so many nations as to make this treaty the most broadly based peace treaty in all history.

Any who are interested in studying the evolutionary processes which have been at work can compare our March draft with the present text. To make that comparison easy, a parallel-column document has been prepared for distribution here.*1* It shows how our conference methods have worked.

The treaty remains, as first agreed, a non-punitive, non-discriminatory treaty, which will restore Japan to dignity, equality and opportunity in the family of nations. But it has been found increasingly possible to do justice to particular situations without violating these basic concepts.

I now turn to a consideration of the principal provisions of the text.

The Preamble is an important part of the treaty. It affords the Japanese nation the opportunity to record intentions and aspirations which the whole world welcomes.

Japan declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations; to conform to the principles of the Charter; to adhere to the new ideals of human rights and freedoms which have become implanted in the Constitution and legislation of Japan; and, in public and private trade and commerce, to conform to internationally accepted fair practices.

If Japan's intentions in these respects are sincere, which we believe, and if they are pursued with resolution, they will go far to restore good will between the Japanese and Allied people.

It may be asked why, if that is so, the treaty does not attempt to put the Japanese under legal compulsion in these respects. There are good reasons for not doing so. Japan, when it applies for membership in the United Nations, should do so because it wants to be a member, not because the Allies compelled it. Eighty million people cannot be compelled from without to respect the human rights and fundamental freedom of their fellows. Fair trade practices cannot be made a formal obligation when they have not yet been spelled out in international conventions. In general, treaty obligations should only be such as can be precisely formulated, so that the parties will clearly know just what are their rights and what are their duties. Where applicable conventions exist, Japan will voluntarily adhere to them, as set out in the declaration appended to the treaty.

Chapter 1 ends the state of war, with consequent recognition of the full sovereignty of the Japanese people. Let us note that the sovereignty recognized is the "sovereignty of the Japanese people".

What is the territory of Japanese sovereignty? Chapter II deals with that. Japan formally ratifies the territorial provisions of the Potsdam Surrender Terms, provisions which, so far as Japan is concerned, were actually carried into effect 6 years ago.

The Potsdam Surrender Terms constitute the only definition of peace terms to which, and by which, Japan and the Allied Powers as a whole are bound. There have been some private understandings between some Allied Governments; but by these Japan was not bound, nor were other Allies bound. Therefore, the treaty embodies article 8 of the Surrender Terms which provided that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and some minor islands. The renunciations contained in article 2 of chapter II strictly and scrupulously conform to that surrender term.

Some question has been raised as to whether the geographical name "Kurile Islands" mentioned in article 2 (c) includes the Habomai Islands. It is the view of the United States that it does not. If, however, there were a dispute about this, it could be referred to the International Court of Justice under article 22.

Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender Terms or deny peace to Japan while the Allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty.

Article 3 deals with the Ryukyus and other islands to the south and southeast of Japan. These, since the surrender, have been under the sole administration of the United States.

Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should be restored completely to Japan.

In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to he brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.

You will recall that the Charter of the United Nations contemplates extension of the trusteeship system to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" (article 77). The future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan while affording the administering authority the possibility of carrying out article 84 of the Charter, which provides that "It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security."

A peace which limits Japanese territory according to the Potsdam Surrender Terms naturally leads one to ask, can a growing population, now numbering over 80 million, survive on the Japanese home islands? A clue to the correct answer is the fact that when Japan had a vast colonial empire into which the Japanese people could freely emigrate, a few did so. Formosa, a rich, uncrowded land with temperate climate, attracted, in 55 years, a total Japanese population of about 350,000. Korea, under Japanese control since 1905, attracted a total Japanese population of about 650,000. In South Sakhalin there were 350,000 Japanese and in the Kurile Islands about 11,000. Japan's colonies helped assure Japan access to food and raw materials, but they were no population outlet. Japanese, like other people, prefer to live at home. So far as emigration is concerned, the territorial clauses of the treaty do not establish restraints greater that those which 98 percent of the Japanese people voluntarily put upon themselves.

Of course growing populations create problems in Japan and elsewhere. The Japanese will need to develop the capacity to perform services which others want, so that in exchange they can buy the food and raw materials they need. This calls for willingness on the part of the Japanese people to work hard, to work efficiently, and to work with creative imagination so that they can anticipate the economic wants of others. Each of the Allied Powers also has a responsibility. The Surrender Terms promised the Japanese "access to raw materials" and "participation in world trade relations". Peoples who are ready and willing to work and to create what others want should have the means to do so. Under such conditions the present territorial status of Japan is no cause for alarm.

Chapter III deals with security, a problem which has not been, and never is, automatically solved by victory. By article 5, Japan undertakes to live peacefully, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. We hope that Japan will promptly become a member of the United Nations. If this were certain, article 5 would be unnecessary. But, in the past, veto power has been used to block the admission of nations qualified for membership. So it is prudent to write into the treaty that, as provided by article 2 (6) of the Charter Japan will settle its international disputes by peaceful means; will refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force; and will give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.

These provisions completely meet the desire which some nations have expressed that the treaty should bind Japan to peaceful processes and explicitly prohibit Japan from acting forcibly, alone or in coalition, against any other nation. There can be nothing more sweeping than the renunciation of offensive force expressed in article 5(a) (ii) of the treaty.

In order, however, that this treaty, like the United Nations Charter, should make it perfectly clear that the prohibition against the use of force does not deprive Japan of the right of self-defense, subdivision (c) of article 5 contains a recognition that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses what article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations refers to as "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense."

Article 6 of the treaty calls for ending the occupation not later than 90 days after the treaty comes into force. However, Japan, as contemplated by article 51 of the United Nations Charter, may enter into collective security arrangements, and these might, in part, be implemented by Allied elements which were in Japan when the treaty came into force. Accordingly, it seemed useful to make it clear that, under such circumstances, these elements would not have to be physically removed from Japan before they could serve as collective security forces. This would be a burdensome requirement, and a risky one, for it would for a time leave Japan wholly defenseless, in close proximity to proved aggressors possessed of great military strength. To avoid that danger, article 6 provides that occupation elements now in Japanese territory may stay on for Japan's defense, if this is wanted by Japan.

These remaining military elements would, of course, have characteristics and powers very different from what they had as occupation forces. They would have only such status in Japan as Japan would voluntarily have given them.

The security provisions which we have reviewed are necessary if the Treaty of Peace is honestly to restore sovereignty to Japan. It has been suggested that the treaty ought to deny to Japan "the inherent right of collective self-defense" and permit only a token right of "individual self-defense".

That kind of a peace, in this present kind of a world, would be a fraud. To give a sovereignty which cannot be defended is to give an empty husk. Indefensible sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. An undefended and indefensible Japan would be so subject to the menace of surrounding power that Japan would not in fact be able to lead an independent existence.

It has been suggested that a collective security arrangement with the United States, such as Japan is considering, would not be a free act or what the Japanese people really want.

That is not a suggestion which will command credence here. Nearly two-thirds of the delegations here are from countries which either have, or are about to have, voluntary association in collective security arrangements which include the United States. These delegations will assume, and rightly assume, that the Japanese people are like their own people, and like most free peoples, in wanting the collective security which may deter aggression.

When I was in Japan last February this topic was discussed with the Japanese for the first time. I then said publicly that Japan, if it wished, could share collective protection against direct aggression. In order, however, to make perfectly clear our Government's position in the matter I had this to say:

"That, however, is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The United States is not interested in slavish conduct......We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice."

No person in this room, and I mean that literally, honestly believes that Japan seeks collective security with the United States because it is coerced. That is palpably absurd.

As the President of the United States pointed out in his opening address to us, security in the Pacific area is being developed on a collective basis which, through combination, enables each nation to get security without making itself into what could be an offensive threat. That is one way to approach the problem. The other way is to prohibit collective security and to follow the policy of "let each country defend itself from aggressors as it likes or as best it can." That latter way, Generalissimo Stalin said, adressing his Party on March 10, 1939, means "conniving at aggression."

Any nation which seeks to deny to Japan the right to collective security and which insists that Japan must stand alone is, at heart, a conniver at aggression. Those who sign this treaty will not lend themselves to that design.

I have expounded the philosophy of the treaty with reference to security because it is a philosophy which has been challenged. I hope, however, that the time I have given to this subject will not lead any delegations to feel that military matters are our principal pre-occupation.

Security from armed aggression is a negative asset. Our dedication is to the positive side of national life and of individual life. Throughout the Occupation the effort has been to create a climate conductive to human development. To that end, the United States has made a tremendous moral investment. President Truman, in his opening address to us, emphasized the social revolution which has been taking place in Japan, the sweeping away of militarism, the establishment of universal suffrage, the extensive land reforms and the rapid growth of labor unions. Also, we are not ashamed of the fact that it was under the Occupation that the Japanese people adopted a constitution forever barring war as an instrument of their national policy. If today we are compelled to think in terms of a treaty which will enable Japan to protect its sovereignty and independence it is not because we seek a re-militarized Japan-that we have done everything in our power to prevent-but because social and economic progress cannot be achieved in the cold climate of fear.

An outstanding humanitarian feature of the Japanese surrender was the Allied promise to return Japanese prisoners to their homes. However, evidence produced before the United Nations General Assembly last September indicated that large numbers of Japanese soldiers, who had surrendered to the Soviet Union 5 years before, had not yet been repatriated. The United Nations expressed its concern and set up a Commission to study this matter. In order to make clear that the Allied undertaking to Japan survives until it has been performed, article 9 of the Potsdam Surrender Terms has been incorporated into the Treaty of Peace (article 6 (b)). We earnestly hope that it will be fulfilled, and tragic anguish be allayed.

Chapter IV deals with trade and commerce. The text is somewhat technical but the words add up to this; Japan is not subjected to any permanent discriminations and disabilities, her economy is unrestricted and no limitations whatever are placed upon her right to trade with each and every country.

The permanent relations between Japan and the Allied Powers, as regards trading, maritime, and other commercial relations (article 22) ; as regards high seas fishing (article 9); as regards international air transport (article 13), are to be negotiated between Japan and Allied Powers so desiring. Pending the conclusion of such treaties, and for a 4-year interim period, each Allied Power will be entitled to most-favored-nation treatment as regards customs duties, but only on a basis of reciprocity.

These are liberal treaty clauses. The fulfillment of the hopes placed in them will, however, depend on whether Japan lives up to its intention, proclaimed in the Preamble, "to conform to internationally accepted fair practices", and on whether the Allied Powers, by their domestic legislation, extend to Japan trading possibilities which are reasonable, having regard to their own domestic requirements. On these matters, a peace treaty can do no more than point the way to a healthy trade relationship and create the opportunity to go in that way. That this treaty does.

Reparation is usually the most controversial aspect of peacemaking. The present peace is no exception.

On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's aggression caused tremendous cost, losses and suffering. Governments represented here have claims which total many billions of dollars, and China could plausibly claim as much again. One hundred thousand million dollars would be a modest estimate of the whole.

On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. Since the surrender, Japan has been 2 billion dollars short of the money required to pay for the food and raw materials she had to import for survival on a minimum basis. The United States had made good that 2 billion dollar deficit. We accepted that as one of our Occupation responsibilities. But the united States is entitled to look forward{sic} to Japan's becoming economically self-sustaining, so as to end dependence on us; and it is not disposed, directly or indirectly, to pay Japan's future reparations.

Under these circumstances, if the treaty validated, or kept contingently alive, monetary reparation claims against Japan, her ordinary commercial credit would vanish, the incentive of her people would be destoryed{sic} and they would sink into a misery of body and spirit which would make them an easy prey to exploitation. Totalitarian demagogues would surely rise up to promise relief through renewed aggression with the help of those nearby who, as we have seen in Korea, are already disposed to be aggressors. The old menace would appear in aggravated form.

Such a treaty, while promoting unity among aggressors would promote disunity among many Allied Powers. There would be bitter competition for the largest possible percentage of an illusory pot of gold. Already, several countries have approached the United States with suggestions that their particular claims for reparation should be favored at the expense of others.

A treaty which, on the one hand, encouraged division among the non-aggression states and, on the other hand, brought recruits to the side of the aggressive states would be a treaty which would recklessly squander the opportunity of victory. The parties to such a treaty would expose themselves to new perils greater than those which they have barely survived.

These conflicting considerations were fully discussed, until there emerged a solution which gives moral satisfaction to the claims of justice and which gives material satisfaction to the maximum extent compatible with political and economic health in the Pacific area.

The treaty recognizes, clearly and unambiguously, that Japan should pay reparation to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war.

It then goes on to dedicate to the implementation of that principle, certain assets which Japan does have in surplus and which could be put to work to help to compensate those nations which suffered the most from Japan's wartime acts.

Japan has a population not now fully employed, and it has industrial capacity not now fully employed. Both of these aspects of unemployment are caused by lack of raw materials. These, however, are possessed in goodly measure by the countries which were overrun by Japan's armed aggression. If these war-devastated countries send to Japan the raw materials which many of them have in abundance, the Japanese could process them for the creditor countries and by these services, freely given, provide appreciable reparations. The arrangements could cover not merely consumer goods but machinery and capital goods which would enable underdeveloped countries to speed up developing their own industry, so as hereafter to lessen their dependence on outside industrial power.

This is, in essence, the formula expressed in article 14 (a) 1. It results from prolonged exchanges of views, particularly with such countries as the Philippines and Indonesia, which were occupied by Japanese forces and injured in a way which places on the Allied Powers as a whole, and on Japan, a very clear duty to seek all means of reparation which are realistic.

I am frank to say that the treaty is a better, fairer treaty than first drafted. That results from the proper insistence of some governments that all possibilities of reparation should be exhaustively explored. That has been done, and the result is a fresh demonstration of the worth of the free processes of free and equal people. Those processes have here produced a treaty formula which serves the ideal of justice within an economic framework which can benefit all concerned.

In addition to this source of future reparation, the treaty validates the taking by Allied Powers of Japanese property within their jurisdictions.

By article 16, Japanese property in neutral and ex-enemy countries is to be transferred to the International Red Cross for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families, on the basis of equity, to make some compensation for undue hardship suffered, often in violation of the Geneva conventions. The United States, in response to some Allied inquiries, has indicated that, since its own prisoners of war have received some indemnification out of the proceeds of Japanese property we seized, we would assume that equity would require first distribution to those who have had no comparable indemnification.

Allied property within Japan is to be returned. Where this cannot be done, because of war damage, there will be compensation in blocked yen in accordance with pending Japanese domestic legislation.

Article 21 makes special provision for Korea. The Republic of Korea will not sign the Treaty of Peace only because Korea was never at war with Japan. It tragically lost its independence long before this war began, and did not regain independence of Japan until after Japan surrendered. Many individual Koreans steadfastly fought Japan. But they were individuals, not recognized governments.

Nevertheless, Korea has a special claim on Allied consideration, the more so as it has not yet proved possible for the Allies to achieve their goal of a Korea which is free and independent. Korea is, unhappily, only half free and only half independent; and even that fractional freedom and independence has been cruelly mangled and menaced by armed aggression from the North.

Most of the Allied Powers have been seeking to make good their promise of freedom and independence and, as members of the United Nations, to suppress the aggression of which Korea is the victim. By this treaty, the Allies will obtain for Korea Japan's formal recognition of Korea's independence, and Japan's consent to the vesting in the Republic of Korea, of the very considerable Japanese property in Korea. Korea will also be placed on a parity with the Allied Powers as regards post-war trading, maritime, fishing and other commercial arrangements. Thus the treaty, in many ways, treats Korea like an Allied Power.

The absence of China from this Conference is a matter of deep regret. Hostilities between Japan and China first began in 1931 and open warfare began in 1937. China suffered the longest and the deepest from Japanese aggression. It is greatly to be deplored that the Sino-Japanese war cannot be formally terminated at this occasion. Unhappily, civil war within China and the attitudes of the Allied Governments have created a situation such that there is not general international agreement upon a single Chinese voice with both the right and the power to bind the Chinese nation to terms of peace. Some think that one government meets these tests. Some think another meets them. Some doubt that either meets them. No majority can be found for any present action regarding China. Thus the Allies were faced with hard choices.

They could defer any peace with Japan until they could agree that there was in China a government possessed of both legitimacy and authority. It would, however, be wrong, cruel, and stupid to penalize Japan because there is civil war in China and international disagreement regarding China.

As another approach, each Allied Power could refuse to sign a treaty of peace with Japan unless a Chinese government of its choice was cosigner with it. That, we ascertained, would leave Japan at war with so many Allied Powers that Japan would get only a small measure of the peace she has earned. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that Japan, an essential party, would willingly cooperate in a program leading to that end. To exert compulsion in this matter would create resentment in Japan, and it would activate and aggravate Allied division in the face of a grave world-wide menace which requires maximum unity.

The remaining choice was for the Allied Powers generally to proceed to conclude peace without any present Chinese cosignature, leaving China and Japan to make their own peace, on terms, however, which would guarantee full protection of the rights and interests of China.

That is the choice reflected by the present treaty. By article 26, China is given the right to a treaty of peace with Japan on the same terms as the present treaty. The victorious Allies, which sign the treaty, take nothing for themselves that they do not assure equally to China. Also, by article 21, China, without need of signature, gets the sweeping renuciation{sic} by Japan (article 10) of all Japan's special rights and interests in China, in accordance with a formula suggested by the Republic of China. Also, China receives automatically, and without need of signature, the benefit of article 14 (a) 2 which validates the seizure of Japanese property subject to its jurisdiction. The treaty preserves, in full, the rights of China as one of the Allied victors in this war.

Chapter VII contains clauses which are largely matters of protocol. Of these article 23, dealing with ratification, gives those signatories to the treaty which have been actively concerned with the Occupation, a special position, for 9 months regarding the bringing of the treaty into force. But after 9 months all of the Allied Powers stand on an equal footing as regards bringing the treaty into force as between themselves and Japan.

Such, in broad outline, are the main aspects of the treaty that awaits our signature.

It contains, no doubt, imperfections. No one is completely satisfied. But it is a good treaty. It does not contain the seeds of another war. It is truly a treaty of peace.

We may hear a suggestion that we should not now complete, by signature, this product of a year's negotiation, but resort to new procedures, with new parties. It may be pretended that thereby we can gain greater unity and more perfection. At first that may sound plausible and tempting. It may seem to offer the partially dissatisfied a chance for great satisfaction.

In some Allied countries there are organized groups which urge that the treaty could be changed merely to benefit them, leaving everything else intact. If all of these proposals were to be brought together, it would be apparent that the cumulative effect would be destructive of any agreed peace.

Fortunately, there are also in most of the Allied countries those who see with truer vision. They know that this treaty is good to the point where it cannot be made better without its becoming worse. Better words might theoretically be found; but to seek these is to let escape what is now within our grasp. There come times when to seek the perfect is to lose the good. This is such a time.

There is greater unity now than we are apt to find if there is renegotiation. The treaty has been painstakingly built by the delicate processes of diplomacy, helped by an unusual display of self-restraint and good will. But it is not wise to assume that those qualities will be ever present and that differences can always be composed.

There is a larger measure of satisfaction now than we can ever get again. Delay will inevitably set in motion corroding forces and contradictory efforts which will block each other and frustrate the possibilities inherent in a common effort of good will.

In terms of Japan's future, delay would cost a price which makes petty all the sacrifices incident to present action. The great goals of victory will have been made unattainable.

It was our common hope that out of the fiery purge of war there would rise a new Japan. That was no foolish hope. Japan has a great culture and tradition which are capable of producing distinctively, but no less authentically, those virtues which all nations and peoples must possess if there is to be a world-wide commonwealth of peace.

In order, however, that that potentiality shall become actuality, Japan needs free political institutions in a climate conducive to their vigorous growth; social progress; an equal administration of justice; an awareness of human dignity; a sense of self-respect, of respect for others.

Above all, Japan needs the will to live at peace with others as good neighbours.

All of this is possible, if we make peace now. It becomes impossible, or at best improbable, if Japan's long deferred hopes are now blasted.

There are, in Japan, new-born institutions of freedom. But they will not flourish if military rule continues indefinitely to be supreme.

Dignity cannot be developed by those who are subject to alien control, however benign.

Self-respect is not felt by those who have no rights of their own in the world, who live on charity and who trade on sufferance.

Regard for justice rarely animates those who are subjected to such grave injustice as would be the denial of present peace.

Fellowship is not the mood of peoples who are denied fellowship.

The United States, which since the surrender has directed the Occupation on behalf of all the Allies, says solemnly to each of the Allies: Unless you now give Japan peace and freedom on such honorable terms as have been negotiated, the situation will rapidly deteriorate.

The Surrender Terms have served their every legitimate purpose. Under them "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers". To perpetuate that subjection, which has existed for 6 years, into more years, would be to pervert the occupation into an instrument of imperialism and colonialism. The United States wants none of that, and we know that most of you want none of that.

It is time to end the subjection of the Japanese Government to Allied command. It is time to end the Occupation and to recognize that, henceforth, it is the Japanese people who exercise complete sovereignty in Japan. It is time to welcome Japan as an equal and honorable member of the family of nations.

That is what the pending treaty will do.

No nation is bound to sign the treaty. This is no Conference that wields legal compulsion. The only compulsion is the moral compulsion of grave circumstances. They unite to cry aloud: Let us make peace.

The Vice President of the Conference-P. C. Spender; The Chairman recognizes the Delegate from the United Kingdom.

The Delegate of the United Kingdom-K. C. Younger: Mr President and Delegates, it falls to me, as the Delegate of Britain, to share the task of Mr. Dulles in presenting this draft treaty to you.

As I do so I have before my mind the history of the relations between the peoples of Britain and Japan. I recall the rapid progress of Japan, aided by friendly countries, in the reign of the Emperor Meiji. I recall the political links and personal friendship which arose at that time between our two countries. Then the leadership of Japan departed from the civilian statesmen who had led the country toward international cooperation and constitutional reform. A policy of military aggression gained the day in

Japan and our countries drifted apart. There followed those tragic events of which this week is the last chapter. The peoples of Britain and the Commonwealth will, I know, welcome the return symbolized by this treaty, to a happier relationship with Japan.

The treaty documents which we are now considering have a noble aim-to make peace. Their purpose is a fair and lasting peace with Japan on terms which will restore her sovereign independence and equality of status, her dignity and self-respect, and which will afford her the opportunity to develop on peace-loving, democratic lines.

They have been drawn up after prolonged consultation between many governments, and they are laid before you on the authority of the two sponsoring Governments, the Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

it is my honor and privilege today to commend these documents to you and to solicit your approval of them.

Before I turn to the substance of the treaty, I wish on behalf of my Government to pay a tribute to the United States Government, who are our hosts at San Francisco. All of us here today know the out-standing part played by the United States in the defeat of Japan and their major share in bearing the burden of occupation. The thought, work and economic reasources{sic} employed in ensuring that Japan, once defeated, should be given a fair chance to resume her place among the free nations of the world, these alone would entitle the United States to speak with special authority in the framing of the peace settlement.

In addition to that, the treaty which is before us today is very largely due to the work of negotiation and coordination undertaken by the United States Government and by President Truman's Special Representative, Mr. John Foster Dulles.

I have myself had personal experience in London of the skill and patience which Mr. Dulles brought to his task.

The principal document we have to consider is the text of the proposed Treaty of Peace with Japan, to which are attached three other documents-a Declaration on War Graves, a Declaration on International Agreements and Conventions, and a Protocol on Contracts. The first three are jointly sponsored by the two Governments. For constitutional reasons it is not possible for the United States Government to sponsor the protocol, which is therefore presented to you by the British Government alone, though in drafting it the same process of consultation has been followed as in the case of the other documents. Like them, the protocol represents common views and not the views of a single government.

Our reason or sponsoring the treaty are many. Our traditional interest in Asia, our exprience{sic} of Asia, the sufferings of countries that were our responsibility, the gallant and finally successful part played by our arms against Japan-all these meant that the terms of the coming peace were in our minds from the moment the war ended. We played our part in war. We had our contribution to make to peace.

The present treaty is not, however, the handiwork of the United States and Britain alone-very far from it. In the first place our contribution to the treaty has itself been influenced and determined, through constant discussion, with the Commonwealth as a whole. About that I will say more in a moment. Next, a great number of the other countries at war with Japan have expressed comments on the treaty and these have now been incorporated in the document before us.

The presnet{sic} treaty is in fact a composite document, contributed from many different sources, in which practically all the powers concerned (including the sponsors) sacrificed points of importance to themselves in the interests of general agreement.

*1* This document, entitled "Comparative Study of the March 1951 Draft and August 13, 1951, Text of the Japanese Peace Treaty", prepared by the United States Delegation, was circulated on September 6, 1951. Copies of the document are available for consultation in the archives of the Department of State.